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abstract
This paper investigates the limitations of the ideal of political equality under non-ideal circumstances 
and focuses specifically on the way in which structurally unjust social contexts endanger individuals’ 
perception of their own worth. Starting from Rawls’ definition of the social bases of self-respect as a 
primary good to be fairly distributed, the paper main goal is to provide normative arguments in favor of 
a power sensitive theory of political agency. A power sensitive theory, in fact, proves to be necessary as 
it sheds a light over the way in which power relationships affect the very possibility, for some members 
of the constituency, of fully enjoying the status of political reflexive agents. Against this background, 
in the paper I defend two main theses. First, I argue that the contemporary debate concerning the 
implementation of the ideal of equality within liberal democracies has been overlooking the epistemic 
dimension of the basis of political equality. Second, I claim that specifying the epistemic dimension of 
political equality has at least two important effects. a. It is important from the perspective of conceptual 
analysis, as it allows to properly distinguish between the normative job played by moral arguments on 
the one hand, and the epistemic aspects of political equality on the other hand. b. The specification of the 
epistemic aspects of political equality has at least on important normative upshot, namely the possibility 
to show that epistemic forms of injustice are detrimental to the very ideal of political equality as an 
essential feature of liberal conceptions of democracy.
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No man is an island entire of itself; every man 
is a piece of the continent, a part of the main; 
if a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe 
is the less, as well as if a promontory were, as 
well as any manner of thy friends or of thine 
own were; any man’s death diminishes me, 
because I am involved in mankind. 
And therefore never send to know for whom 
the bell tolls; it tolls for thee. 
(John Donne, Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions and Seuerall Steps in my Sicknes - 
Meditation XVII, 1624)
Democracy is usually justified, as a valid form of government, referring either to instrumental 
or procedural arguments. According to the instrumental accounts of democracy, democratic 
procedures are justified in the light of the quality of the outcomes that these procedures 
achieve. Instrumentalists ground the validity of democracy appealing to different outcome-
oriented arguments, such as the fact that democracy is a valid form of government because it 
grants the defense of fundamental interests of citizens or the fact that democratic decision-
making procedures are the most reliable to establish good collective choices (Arneson, 1993; 
Landemore, 2013; Martì, 2017; Van Parijs, 1998). By contrast, proceduralist views hold that the 
value of democracy stems from the ideal of political equality incorporated by fair procedures. 
The non-instrumental value of equality that fair procedures mirror acts as a justification 
of democracy. More precisely, a proceduralist account claims that democratic processes 
of decision-making are legitimate in virtue of the equal consideration of the interests and 
preferences of all those involved in decision-making procedures (Beitz, 1989; Dahl, 1989; 
Habermas, 1996; Ottonelli, 2012; Rawls, 1993). 
Democracy — according to this view — incorporates substantive political values that 
democratic procedures should contribute realizing. For instance, for Saffon and Urbinati 
(2013), the significance of democracy, in its historical unfolding, lies upon protecting and 
enacting the principle of equal liberty. The historical purpose of democracy is also its 
normative goal: it is an intrinsic feature of democratic processes to be conducive to freedom 




This is the first feature of a normative version of proceduralism,1 procedural correctness, which 
refers to the intrinsic fairness granted by pure proceduralism (Rawls, 1971, pp. 73-78). A 
second aspect of normative proceduralism hinges on a depiction of citizens as agents actively 
engaged in decision-making processes. The criterion of responsiveness plays an important 
normative role: outcomes of democratic decision-making procedures should address the 
demands of participants involved in the processes either by meeting their valid claims, 
or by offering a justification for rejecting them (Mackie, 2011).2 It follows that democratic 
procedures should respect the agency of every member of the constituency and ensure 
everybody the possibility of impacting public choices. Finally, fair procedures are valuable 
inasmuch they contribute realizing an essential dimension of the ideal of political equality, 
i.e. the value of equal respect. In democracy, the value of equal respect is instantiated by the 
normative requirement of treating each agent on equal footing and of granting them the 
chances of pursuing the life-plans they reckon most meaningful. 
Notwithstanding this large agreement on the value of equality as a political aim, the 
normative notion of political equality requires a more careful analysis. Holding that equality 
is intrinsically valuable does not imply that the discussion about the basis of equality is settled 
(Carter, 2011; Cupit, 2000; Waldron, 1999). Along these lines, the main goal of this paper is 
assessing the very possibility for democratic institutions to establish a social environment 
in which each and every citizen can be fully respected, notwithstanding the asymmetries 
of power and structural forms of injustice that characterize real-world democracies. Since 
justice is not always realized in real-world democracies even when procedures are designed 
to be fair, then it is fundamental to consider the limitations of the ideal of political equality 
under non-ideal circumstances. In section 2, I discuss the Rawlsian notion of self-respect. 
Then, section 3 is devoted to the introduction of the theme of epistemic injustice, showing 
how the asymmetrical relations of power affect not just the actual legitimacy of democratic 
decisions and institutions, but shape how members of disadvantaged groups understand 
themselves as political actors and develop epistemic and practical capacities. In section 4 I 
argue that the normative notion of political equality is twofold: being grounded on both moral 
and epistemic aspects. In conclusion, this paper does not offer a solution to the difficulties 
exposed. Rather, the main goal is to provide normative arguments in favor of a power sensitive 
theory of political agency. A power sensitive theory, in fact, proves to be necessary as it brings 
to light the epistemic dimension of political equality and problematizes the way in which 
power relationships affect the very possibility, for some members of the constituency, of fully 
enjoying the status of political reflexive agents.
The main research-question investigated in this paper was prompted by John Rawls’s (1971) 
well-known thesis that the social bases of self-respect is one of the primary social goods that 
are to be distributed fairly in a just society. According to Rawls, self-respect is one of the 
necessary preconditions for developing citizens’s awarness that their plans of life are worth 
1 Within the proceduralist tradition, we can distinguish between a minimalist view and a normative one. Minimalist 
accounts (Dahl, 1956; Riker, 1982) appeal to descriptive categories and provide a thin account of democracy, grounding 
its legitimacy in the existence of a set of rules of the games, rather than referring to some normative values promoted 
by procedures. The rationale behind the minimalist tactic rests on the acknowledgment of the fact of pluralism and 
of the difficulty in reaching a final agreement on relevant political matters avoiding any anti-democratic form of 
decision-making. By contrast, normative accounts of proceduralism claim that democracy incorporates substantive 
political values that democratic procedures should contribute to realise.
2 Saffon and Urbinati (2013: 20-22) include responsiveness among the important features of their account of 
procedural democracy along with uncertainty; openness and contestation; participation, emendation, and 
non-triviality. 
2. The Social Bases 
of Self-Respect
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carrying out. Rawls is clear in stating that the sense of one’s worth is dependent upon the 
social environment in which one happens to live, therefore the mutual relationships among 
citizens (and among citizens and political institutions) are fundamental for granting the 
social bases of self-respect to each citizen. This intuition is extremely important, explaining 
in political-institutional terms, why “no man is an island”, and why political societies are 
not just the aggregation of self-interested individuals, but something more complex and 
nuanced. The social bases of self-respect comprise both the attitude of others toward me, and 
the social environment where my identity is shaped. First and foremost, a social condition 
of self-respect depends upon the relationship of equal respect that should be established in 
a fair intersubjective context. Second, in order to pursue my conception of the good life in 
a meaningful way, it is probably necessary that in the society I live my identity, and/or my 
preferences, are not stigmatized or wrongfully misrecognized.3
Regarding the condition of enjoying the respect of others, in the recent years many authors 
have investigated the normative notion of equal respect, specifying the distinction, firstly 
introduced by Steven Darwall (1977), between recognition respect and appraisal respect. 
Recognition-respect is attributed in virtue of the recognition of others as persons, hence 
it is ascribed by default, being independent from the evaluation of actions, deliberative 
processes and characters of any particular individual. In this regard, recognition-respect 
is a priori and unconditional and it does not admit degrees. By contrast, esteem-respect 
expresses the positive consideration of the deeds, achievements, character of a person; 
hence it is a posteriori, conditional on actual conducts and comes in degrees (Carter, 2011; 
Galeotti, 2011). Probably Rawls has in mind a comprise of both these forms of respect when 
he stated that “our self-respect normally depends upon the respect of others. Unless we 
feel that our endeavors are respected by them, it is difficult if not impossible for us to 
maintain the conviction that our ends are worth advancing” (Rawls, 1971, pp. 155-156). I 
agree that both these forms of respect are probably necessary for agents to properly see 
their accomplishments acknowledged and for establishing a relational-sensitive awareness 
of agents’ own value. However, I maintain that recognition-respect has a priority over 
esteem-respect when dealing with the social bases of self-respect. In fact, the liberal-
democratic framework requires us to recognize the status of free and equal agent to any 
member of the constituency, independently from her personal achievements, characters 
flaws or rational abilities. In democracy, every citizen should be fully respected qua member 
of the constituency, referring to the status of person as such, regardless of their attitudes, 
preferences, ascriptive characteristics, intellectual capacities, conceptions of the good, 
merits, etc. According to this reading, the social aspects of self-respect are strictly related 
to the institutional framework that grants equal political powers and public recognition 
to each citizen. In fact, a state cannot provide self-respect directly, but only assuring the 
adequate social conditions for it to develop. It follows, that the first social condition of 
self-respect consists in a proper institutionalization of the normative notion of recognition-
respect due to every member of the constituency. 
The second social condition of self-respect is related to the social environment in which 
personal identities are formed and shaped. There is a sense in which our subjective identity 
is inescapably related to the perception of our identity in the social world. Many authors 
have highlighted the social aspects of personal identity (Alcoff, 2010; Butler, 1990; Connolly, 
2002; Gilligan, 1993; Haslanger, 2012; Okin et al., 1999) and showed the effects that public 
3 For further analyses concerning the concept of self-respect, see Bird, 2010; Hill, 1991; McKinnon, 2002; Schemmel, 
2018 and Whitfield, 2017.
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identity disempowerment, double standards and cultural domination have on agents’ ability to 
perceive their worth (Cudd, 2006; Pateman & Mills, 2007; Young, 2000). Looking at real-world 
democracies, it is evident that many citizens have to fight for being recognized as first class 
citizens, given the instances in which some aspects of their identities are mistreated, or the 
burdens they have to endure in order to accommodates their identities to an historically and 
contextually shaped public space.
There are different circumstances of real-world democracies that affect the way in which 
people shape their identities and, consequently, impact on the likelihood that the social bases 
of self-respect are distributed equally and without imposing to some citizens unjustified 
burdens in order to “fit in”. In this section I shall focus on three specific circumstances, 
namely pluralism, conflict and power. The analysis of these three circumstances of politics 
is important for understanding the structural aspects that impact the implementation of the 
ideal of political equality in actual circumstances.4 Such structural (unequal) circumstances 
very often provoke a disempowerment of the members of disadvantaged groups and cause 
questioning regarding their ability to meet the standards (moral and epistemic) from which 
derives the public recognition of citizens as fully autonomous agents. 
Pluralism is a fact of contemporary democracies. From a liberal perspective, it can actually be 
defined as “the normal result of the exercise of human reason within the framework of the 
free institutions of a constitutional democratic regime” (Rawls, 1993, p. xvi). This definition 
reflects the intuition that agents disagree not simply because some of them (or everyone) 
reason in a flawed way. Rather, the argument goes, pluralism is the most likely outcome 
of intersubjective deliberative processes. Many authors have investigated the epistemic 
circumstances that make pluralism an inescapable fact of contemporary democracies. First, 
the appraisal of evidence is always agent-mediated and agents tend to employ different 
epistemic norms. Second, agents start their reasoning from different and not reducible 
doxastic perspectives. Third, agents hold extremely different conceptions of life, ideologies 
and set of preferences, and they tend to trust their own opinion over the opinions of others 
(Christensen & Lackey, 2013; Enoch, 2011; Feldman & Warfield, 2010; Goldman, 2010; Peter, 
2013a, 2013b; Sosa, 2010).
Granted that pluralism is a stable feature of democratic contexts, some accounts of democratic 
legitimacy have defined deep disagreement as the proper expression of citizens’ freedom and 
willingness to state their own perspective publicly (Benhabib, 1994; Biale & Liveriero, 2017; 
Gaus, 1996; Peter, 2008; Rawls, 1993; Talisse, 2012). According to this view, democracy is a 
political system in which the equal worth of the members of the constituency is reflected in 
the equal right to have control over political decisions as well as the possibility of dissenting 
publicly and effectively from the decisions they do not agree with. Confrontation and 
disagreement legitimize democracy by distinguishing it from any other form of government.
Conflict is a second fundamental feature of real-world democracies. Conflict can be positively 
described as the outcome of a functioning democracy, where the satisfaction of one essential 
criterion of democratic legitimacy, namely that no member of the constituency should be 
required to be epistemic deferent toward the majority decisions, is meet consistently. But also, 
4 It is important to distinguish between structural and aggregate explanations (Haslanger, 2016). A structural 
explanation assumes that a social phenomenon can be properly explained as part of a larger phenomenon that sets 
constraints on the behavior of agents. According to this kind of explanations, the reference to structuring causes helps 
explaining patterns and shows how structure can impact agents’ identity formation and deliberative processes. Since 
social structures are often hidden (or anyway not properly laid out), a critique of social structures and the impact they 
have on agents requires normative analysis. 
3. Non-Ideal 
Circumstances 
of Politics and 
Political Agency
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conflict reflects the fact that citizens are committed to values that do not want, or cannot, 
easily change, revise, or abandon. Since agents tend to show epistemic trust in their own 
perspective more than others, they usually lack the motivation for finding a middle ground 
with others. Consequently, albeit conflict should not be depicted as detrimental to democratic 
goals,5 it is indeed true that democratic procedures are required to at least manage conflicts in 
order to avoid indeterminacy over public choices (Gaus, 1996). 
Finally, a third circumstance of real-world I want to concentrate on is power. In non-idealized 
political contexts, the access to political resources is distributed unequally among political 
actors. Moreover, the positional power for establishing and revising social norms and 
standards is often monopoly of members of historically established majorities (Galeotti, 2002; 
Liveriero, 2015b). If we look at the concept of public space, for example, it is quite intuitive 
to understand the role played by power asymmetries in shaping it. Public space, within 
liberal democracies, has been traditionally defined as a neutral and impartial space, where 
every identity can feel included and treated fairly, since such space, by definition, should 
not be partisan or hostage of one party. However, the so-called neutrality of the public 
space is actually infringed by the fact that groups that historically have been holding the 
almost totality of power shaped the public space in their image, unfairly favoring specific 
social standards and norms (Galeotti, 2017). Very often, when social movements or political 
actions demands a revision or a complete rebuke of unfair social norms they encounter 
harsh opposition from members of the majority. Members of established majorities usually 
raise concerns that are vulnerable to double standard fallacies. Indeed, the requests by 
disadvantaged and/or misrecognized groups are often perceived as unjustified pressures 
for obtaining special rights or undue privileges. In order to contrast these unfair – at 
yet rhetorically effective – oppositions to build a less power-sensitive public space (and 
consequently the political society overall) it is important, in my opinion, to relate the fight 
against power asymmetries with a specific definition of political agency that hinges upon 
the normative concept of equal respect. Indeed, the way in which the public space, being 
it symbolic (concerning social standards and the mainstream perception of differences) or 
involving the actual distribution of rights and opportunities, is shaped has a strong impact on 
the fair or unfair distribution of the social bases of self-respect. 
One fundamental aspect to focus on for understanding the normative significance of the social 
bases of self-respect is the definition of political agency. Again, from a strictly theoretical 
perspective, each member of a political constituency, in a properly functioning democracy, 
should have an equal possibility of impacting public choices. However, looking at the non-
idealized circumstances I just laid out, it appears that not every voice counts in the same way 
in the actual political processes. This descriptive conclusion raises more than one flag at the 
normative level. First, there are serious concerns relatively to the effective implementation 
of the duty of respecting the moral standing of each citizen and granting them recognition-
respect. Second, the fact that structural power asymmetries strongly affect the way in which 
conflicts are solved (most often in favor of the group that holds more power) has a major 
impact on the democratic ideal of being responsive toward each citizen, recognizing the status 
of reflexive agent shared by every member of the constituency.
5 It is worth mentioning that the traditional paradigm of deliberative democracy was built around the goal of reaching 
stable consensus among citizens, rather that managing disagreements and conflicts (Estlund, 1993; Habermas, 1996; 
Nino, 1996). This consensualist approach to deliberative democracy has been lately criticized by pluralist democrats 
(Besson, 2005; Mansbridge, 2006; Waldron, 1999) who accused the consensualists of neglecting the value of pluralism, 




This second concerns, in my opinion, can be better understood in relation with the debate 
on epistemic injustice. Members of disadvantaged minorities have to fight way harder to have 
their voice at least heard – and, of course, the fight for being able to actually impact political 
decisions is even more strenuous. And very often, their requests and preferences are ignored 
or treated as not as relevant or epistemically grounded as the requests of members of the 
non-disadvantaged groups. In this regard, members of disadvantaged minorities have been 
suffering unfair treatments that involve, among others, forms of epistemic wrongs. Any public 
attempt to silencing opinions or any instance in which disadvantaged citizens perspectives 
are misrecognized or diminished threatens a fundamental democratic value, namely that 
any individual should be afforded opportunities to express and defend their views in public 
forums, and to have those views heard respectfully. Consequently, members of minorities that 
endure epistemic injustice see their political reflexive agency constantly publicly questioned, 
as they end up lacking the standard entitlement to have their words heard. Also, they 
ususually suffer from a lack of public responsiveness towards their structural disadvantages. I 
maintain that these instances of epistemic injustice are detrimental to the fair distribution of 
the social bases of self-respect, therefore making the case for a pressing need for redressing 
such forms of injustice, otherwise endangering the legitimacy of the democratic basic-
structure in its entirety. 
The conclusion I drew in the previous section has an important normative impact, showing 
that political institutions have a duty to contrast forms of epistemic injustice, because these 
injustices do not simply concern the horizontal interpersonal relationships among citizens 
but, rather, are detrimental to the enactment of the ideal of political equality in institutional 
contexts as well. In order to support this normative standpoint more effectively, in this section 
I introduce a specification of political agency that hinges upon both moral and epistemic 
features. Granted that the moral ground of political equality is not contested within a liberal-
democratic paradigm (what is debated being the normative reasons in support of such moral 
ground), I shall analyze the specific epistemic aspects of political equality. 
Starting from the procedural paradigm of democracy I introduced in the first section, and 
relating this general paradigm with the non-ideal circumstances of politics, an agency thesis 
can be drawn. Agency thesis: the proper exercise of political agency requires actors to politicize 
specific interests and ideals and to challenge the views of other fellow citizens (Biale & 
Liveriero, 2017). This general account of the agential capacities of citizens is compatible with 
the definition of disagreement as the proper expression of citizens’ freedom and equality, 
rather than the outcome of an imperfect or defective decision-making procedure. It is possible 
to conclude, then, that it is exactly in virtue of the fact of disagreement that democracy is 
the best method for collective decisions. If consensus and unanimity were always available as 
stable solutions to political conflicts, in fact, democracy would not be as normatively relevant 
as a collective-choice method. Instead, the political circumstance of disagreement makes 
democratic procedures necessary for: i. overcoming indeterminacy; ii. establishing legitimate 
accountability processes; iii. granting political equality to each member of the constituency; iv. 
respecting the agential perspective of any member, notwithstanding the contextual history of 
social advantages and disadvantages. 
In establishing democratic procedures that should prove to be responsive to any agent 
involved, consequently granting all citizens the possibility of impacting public decisions, 
epistemic deference need to be avoided. To understand such concept, it is important to 
distinguish between members of the party that got defeated in a political decision being able 
to still acknowledge the democratic authority of such decision, and the same party being 
compelled to surrender their opposing judgments to the political decision (Biale and Liveriero, 
4. Epistemic 
Aspects of Political 
Agency
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2017; Estlund, 2008; Gaus, 1996). The requirement of avoiding any form of epistemic deference 
appeals to the normative intuition that agents’ doxastic perspective cannot be bracketed 
when dealing with the political practice of making collective decisions.6 In this regard, public 
decisions should be either justified publicly or being sustained by reasons that are compatible 
with the agent-relative systems of beliefs. 
When we couple the recognition of disagreement as a stable feature of contemporary 
political societies with the normative requirement of avoiding illegitimate forms of epistemic 
deference, it appears that disagreement can be solved referring to an external epistemic 
authority if and only if agents that disagree are at least agreeing in being ready to defer to 
an epistemic authority both parties acknowledge as legitimate. However, the possibility to 
solve instances of deep disagreement referring to external epistemic authorities is extremely 
unlikely when evaluative matters are at stake. The same goes for public battles concerning 
the monopoly of the positional power in establishing the social standards and in shaping the 
public image of a specific society.
When an appeal to an external epistemic authority is not available for solving deep 
disagreement, the conciliatory value of democratic institutions and public decision-making 
processes becomes even more relevant. My proposal here is to look at the mutual accountability 
requirement that democratic processes impose on citizens, namely the fact that they have 
sound normative reasons to recognize each other as equally fallible agents who are capable 
of reasoning and that they owe each other some sort of fair hearing and response.7 This 
normative requirement of mutual accountability has important effects on the concept of 
democratic legitimacy. Democratic procedures are considered legitimate and preferable 
over other collective-choice procedures because they allow solving conflicts and avoiding 
indeterminacy, while respecting every agent that takes part in the deliberation.8 Even 
when my preferences are not included in the final decision, if I had all the opportunities to 
have my voice heard and to impact the final decision, then I should have good reasons for 
acknowledging the legitimacy of the decision and respect the authority that follows from 
it. However, if some members of the constituency have not been properly addressed in the 
deliberative processes and have been treated as less-than-a-fully-autonomous-and-capable-
agent, do they have normative reasons to consider political decisions legitimate? One of 
the main goals of this paper is to argue that members of political societies, that have seen 
their agential capacities diminished for their belonging to ascriptive groups, have a strong 
normative argument against the legitimacy of the democratic institutional setting at large. 
Whenever, in a political setting, members of the politics are disadvantaged, both as recipient 
of distributive collective procedures and as epistemic fully functioning agent, the overall 
legitimacy of the institutional setting should be put under scrutiny. 
6 According to the doxastic presupposition, the epistemic role of justification is not exhausted by the introduction of a 
set of reasons R that provides a propositional justification (non-doxastic) for p. Since the epistemic value of a justification 
partly hinges on agents’ deliberative performances, any comprehensive justification should involve a doxastic analysis 
that assesses whether agent S actually has grounded her belief that p on the reasons that propositionally justify it. For 
further analyses see Brink (1989); Feldman (2002); Turri (2010).
7 A similar analysis is laid out by Fabienne Peter (2013a and 2013b). Analyzing the normative requirements imposed by 
the deliberative structure within a non-ideal setting, Peter observes that reasonable citizens have sound reasons for 
mutually acknowledge each other the status of epistemic peer. This mutual accountability among epistemic peers can 
then be described as the epistemic side of the normative requirement of reciprocity.
8 Famously, Jeremy Waldron (1999) urged that, as long as neutrality is the leading criterion for justifying selecting 
procedures, tossing a coin and majority-rule would both be procedurally valid; therefore neutrality per se does not 
grant fairness. Normative proceduralists, pressed by this critique, have developed procedural models that also reflect 
the commitment of giving equal weight to each person’s opinion, a feature that lacks in random selection.
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Miranda Fricker (2007, p. 1) distinguishes between: i. testimonial injustice that “occurs when 
prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word” and ii. 
hermeneutical injustice that “occurs when a gap in in collective interpretive resources puts 
someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences”. 
I maintain that both these instances of epistemic wrongs are suffered by members of 
disadvantaged groups when they fight to achieve full recognition within a democratic 
society whose standards and norms have been established historically by powerful members 
of a contextually established majority. The lack of empowerment that follows from these 
chronic forms of epistemic wrongs strongly affect the self-perception of agents, that tend 
to internalize the power asymmetries as constitutive of their identities (Dotson, 2012, 2014; 
McConkey, 2004; McNay, 2014; Medina, 2012, 2013). In this way, asymmetries of power end up 
preventing an equal distribution of the social bases of self-respect as well as directly impacting 
the processes of self-identity formation of disadvantaged agents. 
Naturally, this conclusion has deep effects on the assessment of the ability of real-world 
democracies to meet normative standards and to satisfy the requirement of granting equal 
respect to any member of the society, regardless of their personal specifications. Members 
of disadvantaged groups are not fully respected for at least two reasons. First, the practice 
of publicly exchanging reasons is legitimate if and only if each agent is treated on an equal 
footing. Second, the agency thesis requires that each citizen is treated and respected as a 
putative epistemic authority. This second normative request can be derived from the normative 
concept of equal respect (in the Darwall sense of recognition-respect) that grounds normative 
approaches to proceduralism. I have showed that democracy, for being a legitimate system for 
selecting publicly political decisions, should grant to everybody the default position of equal 
respect, without first requiring an assessment of the actual cognitive, moral, and practical 
abilities of each citizen. Hence, democratic procedures are legitimate if and only if they 
grant a normative ascription of reasoning powers and agential capacities to each member of 
the constituency, granted the satisfaction of minimal criteria.9 This request relies upon the 
epistemic intuition that, within a collective-decision framework, when dealing with evaluative 
matters, agents possess no conclusive epistemic reasons for assuming that their belief is 
necessarily true and for dismissing the beliefs that other parties hold doxastically. And granted 
that with reference to evaluative disputes it is unlikely that conflicts could be solved appealing 
to an external, publicly recognized, authority; then citizens, have both moral and epistemic 
reasons for mutually recognizing each other as putative epistemic authorities — where such 
authority is strictly dependent on their different doxastic systems of beliefs (Liveriero, 2015a). 
According to this interpretation, the normative core of the concept of political equality 
within a democratic procedural paradigm involves two different aspects of equality: i. one is 
the proceduralist tenet that equality is a non-instrumental value that should be mirrored in 
political institutions that distribute the power of impacting political choices equally (practical 
authority); ii. the second aspect of equality is intrinsically epistemic and requires citizens to 
acknowledge each other the status of putative epistemic authorities, in order to avoid any 
forms of epistemic wrongs (that usually target the members of chronically disadvantaged 
groups). This twofold definition of political equality, if correctly put in practice, should get rid 
of any form of epistemic wrong that can be prevented institutionally. 
In conclusion, I maintain that, in the practice of exchanging reasons to reach a public agreement 
over political matters, citizens should share practical and epistemic authority, both as co-authors 
9 These minimal criteria can be envisioned in the term of the basic capacities required to be granted the right to vote. 
5. Conclusion
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of the political decisions and as fallible epistemic agents that disagree but have good reasons 
(normative and epistemic) for respecting each other as putative epistemic authorities. This 
twofold description of the normative concept of political authority hinges upon a definition 
of political equality that relies on both moral and epistemic features. Specifying this dualist 
account of political equality is extremely relevant for at least two reasons: i. it provides a fuller 
account of the normative ideal of political equality; ii. it helps developing a framework that 
defines epistemic forms of injustice as instances of social suffering that endanger the very 
possibility for agents to be granted the social bases of self-respect. According to my analysis, 
being disempowered epistemically has an harmful impact of the way in which members of 
disadvantaged groups understand themselves as political actors and consequently negatively 
affects how they develop their political agency. In conclusion, suffering structural injustices 
related to epistemic wrongs have constitutive detrimental effects on the ideal of ascribing full 
reflexive agency to every member of real-world democratic societies.
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